Technology, trade and West Germany's Osthandelspolitik by Mayes, Phyllis L.
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY
P hyllis 1 . Mayes
ENTITLED Technology Trade and West Germany’ s Osthandelspolitik
IS APPROVED BV ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 
DEGREE OF Bachelor o f Arte In Liberal Arte and Sciences
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF.____ ■?°.^ .tt.c-a l Sclancc
WEST OBMUXY'S
BY
PHYLLIS L. HAYES
THESIS
for the
DEGREE OP BACHELOR OP ARTS 
IH
LIBERAL ARTS AND SCIENCES
Collego of Liberal Arts and Selenees 
University of Illinois 
Orbana, Illinois
introduction 4«4ii»l|»*M*i*ty|»M«« SO * • 0 ||#9|||| J
Dtfininf and Keasuring Technology........„ 3
Evolution of Technology Transfer.........  |q
Ferns of Technology Transfer ...... ........ 22
Art II
Introduction .. ............................. ... 33
OethendslopolItih Between the Superpowers .....
Relations with Astern Europe . ........ . 32
Final Assessment and Conclusion . .........62
Footnotes . ........... ..... . 70
A Selected Bibliography ....................... ft
We live In a world increasingly do«tnated by technology*
Not only are technological developments used to improve end p r o ­
mo t e exportst they have become a publicized Western export in and 
of themselves. Yet, technology is so fluidf so adaptable , that 
it is often built into the goods and, thus, difficult to separate
from general trade statistics. These problems are considered in 
Chapter One,
The purpose of this paper is to offer a broad survey of the 
field of technology transfer from the West to the East, I adop­
ted what might be called an "evolutionary" approach, In the first 
part, the characteristics of technology tradet its history and 
present forms are presented (Chapters Two and Three)*
With this to serve as a basis, the second part reviews the 
policy of West Germany towards the Hast as a pmdtical example*,
The evolution of this policy and current relations with the Super­
powers and Eastern Europe are discussed in Chapters Four to Six* 
Finally, some assessments are made on the overall effectiveness 
of technology trade.
Technology trade is specifically tailored by each country 
for its partner* What is in demand in Eastern Europe is not ne­
cessarily desired by the Soviet Union (or the U*S,) . Although 
technology transfers have expanded, a multitude of forces still 
act upon it, pulling it one direction and then another* Of these 
factors, not all are political in nature. West Germany is an
excellent exampla of ho* systemic differences can block expansionj
these might be, by far, the hardest to overcome*
H f  phrase «tecbheS%r1fe*^fti* s w i a / o s  ^  1*
self-explanatory. Unfortunately, there are winy difficulties in
both defining and measuring technology tranefer. Surely, effective
study le predicated on an accepted definition, yet no such undisputed
definition exists, Marlly Liebrans broadly defines technology
tranefer ae "...all ltene reflecting a fins'a knowledge of a certain
product or process that are passed from that firm to other enterprises 
The Office of Technology Assessment identifies technology, in its
commercial applications, as
"...equipment and processes that'.trans­
form raw materials into goods and services,«.» 
the training that accompany these, or...the 
final products like computers that embody high 
technology," 2
The trick here is to decide what items fall into each category.
When does a good cease to be merely a good and emerge,butterfly-like, 
as a creature of pure technology? Even the specifically cited 
example of computers can lead to ambiguity. Do simple home com­
puters or calculators "embody" high technology to the same extent 
that the incredibly complex models at the top of IBM's line do?
Eugene Zaleski and Helgard Wienert attack fee problem from the 
other end. Defining technology simply as knowledge, they focus on 
"transfer" in technology transfer, defining it as
"a process whereby innovations (new pro- 
or know-how) obtained in one country are then 
transmitted for use to another, It,..implies 
an active role on the part of both the-trans- 
ferer and recipient"(authors' Italics)'
Technology transfer exists to fill a so-called "technology 
gap" between the last and Vest. The gap's affects on the gross 
national p*f -ct (QNP) of the individual socialist economies can
5
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depth*; *11 suffer m m  ft**t, 0B» method i# to l«0k 0  ft* volume 
at teelmal& tmiftn The theory le that « deerteeing demand for 
technology signifies a narrowing technological gay) aa expending 
demand implies the opposite. One could consider changes in foreign 
trade as a guide. However, trade flows by theaselves are iaperfect
measures, First, Western restrictions can liait Eastern exports. 
Traditionally, the West has supplied technology for raw Materials
from the East, Western tariffs are more likely to be erected
against Eastern machinery than Eastern raw materials. Thus the
technology gap would seem deeper than it would be in truth, Second, 
since socialist governments have had chronic shortages of hard 
currency, what there is can be spent only on "necessities,M Tech­
nology has always enjoyed a higher priority than consumer goods.
Third, the domestic technology may be adequate but, even so, insuf­
ficient to export. Another guide is the sale of Western licenses. 
Unfortunately, these figures can never fully take into account the 
amount of technology obtained through unofficial channels, such as 
industrial espionage or mass reproduction of a few purchased 
prototypes, A second approach could be to compare the aggregate 
factor productivities (API) of the two areas, For this method, 
the volume (or changes therein) of output can beset against that 
due to factors of production, such as capital or labor, The AFP 
approach calculates the effect of labor productivity or capital 
improvement and subtracts it from measured economic growth in GHP| 
what is left is assumed to be the result of technological developments
& . - J A  .,r. -k ? ; *  ' '
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l*«v« concluded tb lf  -4Se tjsst 
the Eset and ** by implication •• gore advanced technology. fhis
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could be an inaccurate assumption. For one thing, applied tech* 
nology rarely exists in a pure form when it is applied to production! 
usually it is built into new equipment or embodied in new skills 
that lead to improved labor productivity. Differences can also 
arise from sources other than technological imbalances. It can be 
a result of inefficient allocation of resources by an economy; this 
complaint is frequently dirested at command economies by critics.
Differentials in AFP can also be due to uncontrollable factors
such as cultural work ethics, climate or varying quality of raw 
materials, A state might also lack technology in a specific area 
simply because it is unnecessary; perhaps imports can satisfy 
demands so completely and economically th it resources need not be 
expended on R & D, Lastly* by looking at the economy only as a 
whole, a gap which mi^ht exist in certain sectors and not in others 
could be averaged in ond generalized 1o represent the whole. Lo­
gically, the third method goes one step beyond to compare specific
sectors of an economy nuchas agriculture, computers, chemicals 
or electricity, 1%ese studies are the most effective but difficult 
and time-consuming. Affected and aewuted hy political considerations 
and calculated business risks ti,e. abnormally low voices), market 
prices alone are an inadequate scale, expertise on th* conditlonc, 
principles, goals and production processes of the Western sectors, 
as well as their Western counterparts is necessary, Syatemic 
differences between market and planned economies must be con­
sidered, especially those which relate to national policies itr 
quality, quantity and/or economic goals. Effective analysis also
'■ii'iCJiii- -si'..-sCv’i  ■ ■ ■ > . . 'OiSiOS'.teSi
requires Clitoris, which are neither ethnically nor geogrnphically 
limited. Finally, for reasons aentioned above, it is difficult to 
assemble accurate facts and figures on the effectiveness and rate
of diffusion of new technology.
Nevertheless, several elements of the typical command eco­
nomy have been identified as barriers to technological developments 
and international competitiveness. Bonuses are the basic incentives 
offered workers and managers. These are awarded for meeting pro­
ductivity targets. Thus, the emphasis is on quantity, not quality. 
If a manager does adopt new innovations, he runs the risk of losing 
the bonuses, which are needed income supplements, if he fails or 
being burdened with higher and more difficult targets if he succeeds 
It is highly unlikely for a manager to introduce a new proceedure 
or equipment design on hiB own? R & D is removed from the factory. 
All proposals are selected, studied and designed in a specially 
designated bureaucracy. This extreme centralization leads to 
rather disjointed and jerky progress. There is a lack of effective 
communications. The scientists may not be fully aware of factory 
needs and whether those needs have been adequately met. There 
is no feedback mechanism. Since the decisions are simply imposed 
from above with virtually no detailed explanation of possible 
benefits* manager® »ste« bitterly resent any changes. Projects 
can be subtly sabotaged* Kinaily* aince governmental decisions < 
snd »vrket forces nllocate resources, there is no "invisible hand" 
to promote eff-' rtemcj am* improved quality** Where these inade­
quacies do not result directly in a *ge>*S tH*y often lead to 
bottlenecks* Stagnation in one wee, such ae micro-chip tech­
nology, can alow but not step evolution in other areas as well,®
Sew^izirtf tb>- existence of a technological gap, if not its 
precise dineaeiona, ««ny analysta, especially Europeans, go c  to 
«•****' the benefits of tcchaology transfer for Jtjte lest •
i - , ;v
M  ss-tbe These proponents see political stability
air mn important goal of the international system, They contend 
that political, -is well as economic, stability is test achieved 
%  into i*dep«denc<? ano interdependence swans close economic ties, 
■AM ii the two damps be c o m  increasingly bound to one another, it 
bill become m m  mm m m  costly for the Soviet Union, for example, 
t# tA m  actions that bight sever relations, Technology transfer -* 
as opposed to conventional trade «•*» is especially desirable 
since it establishes broader, sore lasting contact that leads, in 
turn, to better understanding on both parts, Those who t a w  
strengthening tier* fee * that the overall security of the lest is 
not tnre&tened an 1 ng as ? he technology or goods are not intended 
for the military. They also submit that the overall economic 
superiority of "he «a.:t will not be damaged since the inherent 
limitations in dantern economies previously mentioned will con- 
tinue to inhibit effective innovation. Although its economies 
benefit :mu nrogre-.^ .. accordingly, the Inst will always lag behind 
the went, dince *? i just that,, a. lag, and not a complete absence 
of any resonreh, or, burgoo a are'a fairly ineffective weapon. Tech* 
nouogy can b< de.i ip -j <<r made more expensive but not completely 
lacked, w } . c, preferable to develop relations through 
forroot.p, ? *r r - dr.-. .• *.*oonomic assistance than harrassment.
In as;-’ c.'»: » c o? r ' a: rdw^iys be circumvented by industrial 
f?jap:anrre,  ^n. ^. r it before they steal it. Another -*
■ ^ . i O ^  -I';, ? ' : ■ ^ : B iB  B 'B 'B - 'B B i-
8seemingly insurmountable —  barrier to controls is the inability 
of Western leaders to come to a consensus on the extent, the 
content or oven the existence of controls*. Without unanimity the
idea is empty rhetoric* 
n the other handf some analysts, for instance those influencing 
the Peagan administration, look at the same facts from an opposite 
perspective* They stress that, \lch the perpetual worsening of 
the military imbalance, technology is the Westfs one advantage 
over the East* Interdependence might indeed be helpful but the 
East is not becoming dependent} it is just borrowing for the 
present* dorse, even in Point ventures, Western firms do not 
exercise final authority over the technology; for simple sales it 
is completely out of their hands after the deal is struck* Tech­
nological ties have not constrained the Soviets in the past, as 
Poland, Angola and Afghanistan demonstrate. Thus, the West is 
simply squandering one of its most valum a resources,and creating 
potential competitbre it does not need with domestic industries 
already feeling threatened by other .Vostorn firms* Broad controls 
on technology co t.io . nst are needed, j t j j all well and good 
to decide toiimit military goods bu% with the increased versatility 
of todayf a teeha-,'! o/.:y, the tne between civilian and military 
applications grows furrier aij. the time* Thus, national security 
or overall Western security could be threatened# These critics 
reject thr suggeu v d  inoffoctiveness o" controls# Admittedly 
the West has had difficulties in presenting a unified front, 
nonetheless , when one is achieved It works* It also should not 
be forgotten that even inefficient controls can have an effect*
9There would be no ;..urKot for industrial espionage if current
controls were not dolin'
r.r^'u-* ore precisely the
' ’ ! : ■ U t e{j j (jrider ( JO l 0 0
In addition, the controlled
onoo ip. which the Worst remalno the nn- 
‘ techno.; for instance), Jelling
••ch no logy (':’-'rc In’" r.t " .leal.:" it i poor idea, not onl
nS !Tlir',!'' l''1 ^ eec.-uine '.Ver.tern firms rarely receive
i.ri.«. . 1 • or th<'Lr t,ochnoJor.v# Without market forces it -ill
'•'•rendr. on nogot.1 atlon skills."
Evolution of Technology Transfer
Depending upon which attitude has been in favor throughout 
the decades# East-West economic relations have been alternately 
encouraged or stifled but never corn?;! etely abandoned. Histori­
cally, the pattern of tachnoogy transfer can be analysed as two 
interwoven -- but not identical -- strands: one conectedvith m-* 
Soviet Union and the other with the nations of Central Europe.
The reigns of ieter and Catherine the Great in the 18th cen­
tury were high points for the importation of Western technology 
into .Russia. Tho technology took the form of both human capital 
and capital equipment. Foreigners established industries, often 
stayed on as managers or even worked as managers of purely Russian 
enterprises. By 19OQ, an estimated minimum of 70 percent of the 
capital in mining, machine-building and metallurgy came from 
foreign companies. There really was not, strictly speaking, any 
technology transfer between the West and the countries of Central 
Europe. It must be remembered that only Bulgaria and part of 
Romania were independent. The rest of Central Europe were parts 
of the German, Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires.^
In the I9^0s an economic priority of the Communist regime 
in Russia was ensuring state ownership of the means of production. 
Thus, the ftate confiscated all foreign assets and established a 
monopoly on foreign trade. However, after peace treaties had been 
signed between tho new government and Western nations and Lenin1s 
New Economic Policy (NEP) had been initiated, the level of foreign
11
increased for Russia. This development was encouraged by the first 
Five Year Plan of 1928# One of the tools adopted by HEP- to pro* 
mote thv inflow of technology deemed necessary to accelerate 
socialist growth was concessions. Although the idea was ideolo­
gically distasteful, by 1926, 97 were in existence and formed the 
major vehicle for technological transfers* Gerpany possessed the 
major portion ofthe concessions (nearly one-third)} the U.S, and 
the U.K, had a higher volume of investments. Host concessions 
dealt with the mining and processing industries. Another important 
vehicle used in conjunction with concessions was the technical 
assistance agreement. These agreements furnished equipment for 
new firms as wo1} as aid in construction and operation* In return, 
foreign workers were allowed to participate in construction and 
installation* Most technological assistance agreements dealt with 
metallurgy. The first technological agreement was signed in 
1923; by 19.50 134 existed. Once again, Germany had the lead in 
sheer numbers but the U*S, was involved in more traditionally 
critical areas, As a final note, the pattern of Soviet trade began 
to alter at the end of the 1920s. Exports shifted slightly, away 
from Germany and towards Great Britain and the United States. 
Germany's contribution to Soviet imports plummetted much more 
dramatically from W ?.5 to 22.1 percent (1929)# In contrast, 
between 1913 and 1929, the U.S.’s share rose from 5#7 to 20.1 
percent. In general, machinery and,equipment began with increasing 
strength to dominate the composition of Soviet imports.^
Trade also began to emerge in Central Europe. After WWI 
and the break-up of the empires, what was formerly internal trade
became, of course, foreign trade. Although economic relations were 
originally contained, for the most part, within the region, this 
relationship noon began to alter. Trade between Central Europe 
and the Soviets was halted by the October Revolution and, when 
it resumed, did so at n greatly reduced level, On the other hand, 
Western-oriented trade increased through efforts on both sides.
The Central European currencies once again became convertible and 
quantitative barriers to trade were lowered, Creditsf to* aid the 
new economies, which were guaranteed by the League of Nations, 
were extended by the Western nations, 10
While the Central European nations were becoming tied to 
the West, by the 1930s, Stalin had opted for a goal of economic 
and technological independence. Foreign trade was no longer seen 
as an "efficient11 tool for economic development. Imports were, 
therefore, drastically cut back. Exports were promoted only to 
pay for the imports. To maintain this balance despite the global 
depression,.soviet exports wore sold at lower prices. Despite 
official distaste, foreign economic ties were never completely 
eliminated. Western aid was used for truck-building as well as 
dam and hydroelectric projects. The concessions of NEP were 
completely eliminated; relations were based primarily on tech­
nological assistance agreements, which were seen to be more 
clearly under official control. By 1945, 200 of these agreements 
were in ecistence, most with German and American companies.
General trade agreements were also signed in the 1930s with 
various nations: France, America, Turkey, Belgium, Luxembourg 
and Germany, ^ 1
....... "• , , ,/■ .<v ' . - J,„4 - -J . . :■ - •
At the same time, the internatbnal depression devastated 
Central Europe, Trade plummetdd, Although.the agrarian countries 
recovered first, all were in trouble, especially in terms of their 
onerous payments for foreign-held debts. The situation deteri­
orated so rapidly that payment was suspended in 1932 and exchange 
controls were again introduced. Protectionism swept the continent; 
barriers were erected and intra-Central European trade suffocated. 
Industrial nations expanded their agricultural sectiors and 
versa. Germany and the U.S, remained the major Western trading
tppartners, however.
The political bipolorizatbn following WWII replicated itself 
as an economic division as well. The bipolar world transformed 
"Central11 Europe into "East" Europe. Although contact was never 
completely lost, East-West trade flows were basically re-channelled 
back into themselves. The percentage of East bloc imports origi­
nating in the West dropped from 74 percent in 1938 to 42 percent. 
in 1948 and then plunged even more dramatically to 14 percent 
in 1953. 1 3
Nominal measures were taken by the West to prevent such a 
development. The Marshall Aid offer was extended to the Eastern 
nations as well. No one was surprised when it was refused by 
the U.S.S.R, and then, of course, by its satellite nations. In 
response, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) was 
formed in 1949. This economic withdrawal, as well as other dis­
quieting political moves, prompted the West to further weaken eco­
nomic links by initiating both export and import restrictions.
The U.S,, in its role as "leader", passed the Export Control Act
of 1949, which prevented exportation of goods with potential 
military application!-# The scope of ouch an embargo was htoadoned 
under the Battle Act of 1951 • An international co-ordinating 
committee (COCOM) was organized in 1949 to coordinate these multi** 
lateral lists of embargo items among the Western allies; technology 
was one of the areas most carefully scrutinized* Each nation 
simultaneously maintained its own list. Of course, the Trading 
with the Enemy Act of 19**7 was a sword of Damocles over the head 
of every American firm, The U,5, also denied the East its markets 
through the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, This legis­
lation empowered the president to revoke any tariff concessions 
granted an Eastern nation and imposed general import controls,
.Since the East European countries were not members of GATT that 
organization1s liberal policy towards trade controls did not 
officially apply* Clearly, during the Cold War, the U,S,fs (and 
theoretically all the Allies1) primary goal was to hinder economic 
and military development of the East Bloc, Therefore, the U,S, 
refused, most-favored nat ion status, credits and loans and closed 
markets to the East, American policy-makers were kept equally 
busy trying to keep the other Western allies in line with this 
policy.
In this game of economic warfare, the Soviets were i n a 
defensive postion. They did not have to economically destroy 
the West; they just wanted to insulate themselves and their client 
nations from Western threats. It was* therefore, necessary to 
divide East from West and bind the nmr socialist nations to each 
other and especially the Soviet Union, Ironically, the two goals
proved to be mutually compatible; Western trade controls helped 
to separate the two camps as effectively as any official pro- 
no wneementfrow Moscow*1** East European nations turned from the 
West for reasons in addition to Soviet pressure for "economic 
self-sufficiency"* although this was obviously the major cause*
For on© thing* the very nature of the Marshall plan redirected 
European trade across the Atlantic towards the D*S, For another* 
the nations of East Europe were themselves faced tiLth the day-to*, 
day difficulties of rebuilding their devestated domestic economies 
foreign trade was simply not the highest priority*
Technology continued to trickle eastward* nevertheless* 
However, the least used channel was direct trade* Official policy 
by both the tl#S, and U*S*o*R* forced a preponderance of int|W***CMBA 
trade* one very important channel was the Lend-Lease program and 
its "supply protocols*.*1 The Soviets received nearly 1125 billion 
of some of the U*S*’s best industrial equipment* which affected 
nearly two-thirds of all the large industries* Another source of 
technology war war reparations the Soviets extracted from its 
new "allies" in East Europe* Billions of dollars* worth of war 
reparations was made in the form of direct monetary payment* most, 
from Germany, commodities or plant dismantlement* Finally* many 
ex-German assets were expropriated. The Soviet forces unmoved' 
approxiamtely E5 percent of the industries not even in the Soviet 
occupation zone and —  together with most of the capital which 
was in its zone —  shipped it back home* ^
East-West trade improved after Stalin1s death (1953)* The 
East once again began providing raw materials*in exchange for
15 :
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Western equipment and machinery* a slight acceptance of on inter- 
notional division of l: .-or# One reason for this turnaf*ouhd can be 
found in the changing attitudes of the West Europeans* at least* 
Although the loss of Eastern markets had formerly been acceptably 
several factors combined to reawaken their interest* The gradual 
elimination of American aid made the threatened cut-off of any
such aid for Eastern trade less disaaterous# Due to this decrease 
in the flow of American financial support* the Europeans had to 
look elsewhere for possible sources of hard currency to help 
remedy balance of payments difficulties* Another factor •• perhaps 
felt more than voic e! n-; :/at —  was frustration with a policy of 
economic warfare that did not seem to have restricted the Soviet 
Union politically or militarily.16 Developments within the East
bloc helped thaw European attitudes* The unrest in East Europe*
which showed the U,E*;;*p# to be somewhat less than omnipotent* 
Khrushchev's de-*Etalinization and his "offensive of international
amic'-nliity11 nd. helped to relax fears of .soviet exranaion* 
changes were expressed in general in attitudes rather than 
measurable economic or trade indicators. Unfortunately* this
These
relaxation had n
A! i iar "e* 11) r .! n
■of-e what
toncof
divisive influence within tKo western 
tho Vast Euro’'eons assumed a narrower
view - f tno "v.tatcgic" gpode covered by the embargo. The U.S** on 
the other uaud* ex ru e : its definition to include of economic an 
well as military import once* During this time* the alias aban­
doned U* \ credit policy* extending long-term credits for various 
projects* Only 3 at or* the U.E, joined tne crowd -- albeit reiuit* 
taniiy ■ by extending medium term credits* j.ong term bilateral
agreements also began to appear. As of I960, <?3 were in force,
My the mid*1960s those trade arrangements hri expanded to Include
1 7scientific and teehnical assistance# ■
As the 1960s began, Western markets began to look inerea- 
singly attractive to socialist nations# In addition to the idea 
of peabeful political /coexibtance, Khrushchev advocated peaceful 
economic coexistence# Trade policy was modified; it became 
acceptable (even desirable) for the West to provide goods needed 
in critical sectors, This included grain for the agricultural 
sector and machinery and technology for fledgling industries 
deemed important enough# These imports would hopefully form a 
shortcut for catching up# Exports were not just "led11 by imports; 
Khrushchev now grudgingly admitted that exports could, in and of 
themselves, be beneficial# Khrushchev therefore focused on im*> 
proved trade relations at meeting with both McMillan (U*K#) and 
Adenaauer (FRG); his overtures to Eisenhower were rebuffed#*®
The CHEA members began to get over their dislike and distrust of 
the EEC, Although the EEC is an economic organization, it was 
formed for unabashedly political reasons# Since NATO was developed 
at about the same time 0957), the East viewed the EEC as merely 
the political arm of NATO (and, by association, the U#S#)# In 
addition, depending on the degree of integration achieved, the 
EEC could potentially wield a substantial amount of political power# 
Lastly, a common tariff wall was the last thing the already"stunted 
foreign trade of the Erast needed#*^ However, with the exception 
of the U,S#S#R#, the CMEA nations have historically based much of 
their economies on trade# The problems posed by currency incon­
IB
vertibility anti awkward —  but necessary —  bilateral treaties 
hindered itfcj&*CivtKA trade. On the other hand, the world market 
offered goods that were not only of better quality but also cheaper* 
Outside trade became even more necessary as the momentum of offi­
cial extensive, or investment-fad, growth petered out and produc­
tivity rates began to dip. Around this time the dangers of the 
technological sop •>} '> heron to, manifest themselves. All these 
factors led to a phoenix-like ro-eraergence of technology transfers* 
After Brezhnev and Kosygin came to power a unique phase of 
Soviet economic history was initiated, headers were concerned 
with the dimensions of the technological gap with the West and 
tentatively attempted (in a few areas) to improve the efficiency 
and effect!voncns of technological innovation. These reforms 
included the use of sales and profit as indicators for performance, 
material incentives, certification, price realignment and direct 
links between research organizations and firma/suprliers end trade 
organizations. There are several reasons why Kosygin’s plan did 
not fulfill expectations. First, the system promoted material 
intensiveness, that is, the higher the value of the good produced, 
the bettor for bonuses. Thus, Instead of seeking out the cheapest 
method, Soviet firms may have opted for the most expensive way 
possible, Second, consumers still had virtually no options for 
feedback. For instance, many customers were forced to sign sales 
contracts without ever having seen the item# Nonpayment by some 
of these customers also put a strain on trade inspection/oversight, 
transportation and credit structures. The program to provide more 
stringent certifications of quality has been used in the recent
past less to improve quality than to justify increased prices on 
the theory fo "you get what you pay for.” lie 19? )  resolution ' 
'ill Tworoving Planning and Strengthening the Economic Mechanism's 
Influence in Enhancing Production Kffiency and fork Quality"
undid most of Kosygin*e intentions,. Central planning was re­
established and the nature of success indicators was no Soager
simply sales and technological improvements, Group bonus#* to 
spur productivity returned. Once again, accusations of persona] 
or even criminal responsibility for economic woes flourished. 
Gross output continued to determine wages, bonuses and investment
quantity, not quality, woa ali-iir.oortant. Finally, P D offices 
were paid by the number of completed contracts, not by the esti­
mated economic benefits of e f f o r t s . T h e Soviet's brief flir­
tation with market forces was over. Nonetheless, the Kosygin 
reforms are important for tent-West technology trade because they 
helped thmv the business community in the Soviet Union and —  by 
transference —  in East Europe, Thi* inspired a little more con­
fidence on the part of Western businesses* The reforms sided 
aad w **» aided by the gathering feeling of detente, The failure
and ultimate rejection of the Kosygin reforms also doomed East- 
Wert trade to yctomic limitations, the exeet nature of which will
h# d i n c - i s ‘ x * ter*
pHo th<' ahort*lj /co Kosygin reforms, the policy of 
detente noth the ti.,% arid th-. achieved in the late 1960s
through the ) provide^ m o ntcaosa..tv climate to stimulate
Kast*.-/est trade, lor M s i Kurope^ it was a sign of official (l*e# 
Soviet) approval* For .lost Kn*op<l| the relaxation of the strategi
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embargo and the resulting increase in competiton made Eastern 
nrrkets even more important, U.S. reluctance to engage in East-
/ost "entangj orient:;" wnr, officially overcome in 1969, The hopes 
of economic detente were crystallized in the Export•Administration 
Act, which repinesi the Export control Act and which was mandated
p I
to foci] itate trie peaceful development of Hast-West trade* Yet, 
Other forces wore also in play at the time* By 1971, the Soviet 
Uninn had pu w.ed through the CMMA the PComprehensive Program for 
the Further extension and Improvement nf Cooperation and the 
development of Socialist economic Integration," a title which, 
fortunately, ex rlairin its purpose as well* dven closer coopera- 
tiin wao envisioned in Moscow through the "co-ordinated Plan of 
i lui til a toral I ntegration Measures for 1976-80*" Soviet hopes 
for integration ran aground for various reasons* Inconvertability 
of member currencies nosed (and still do ) as much of a problem 
among each other as with the West* As a result, it is very dif­
ficult to equalize prices* Another factor is outright reluctance, 
especially by maverick Romania, towards such a melding* Any such 
action is viewed suspiciously as yet another attempt by the Soviet 
Union to dominate CM ,a even further* Nevertheless, some slight 
motions were initiated** in 1971 the East Bloc introduced tar­
nations! economic organizations," to facilitate innovation, and 
technology exchanges, which suspiciously resemble Western multina­
tional corporations* These "organizations11 are financed in terms 
«, f the currency of the host country and transferable rubles, are 
subject to that country’s laws and are specifically organized and 
operated to make a profit. Of the 211 agreements the Soviet Union
. : ai
had signed by 1978 one*third were multilateral and the others were 
bilateral* Agreements have also been signed that pertain to 
specific industries within limited regions* These are the Eastern 
counterparts to the Westfs joint ventures**^ Yetf these efforts 
have not replaced Hast*Went technology trade* Eastern nations have 
been increasingly willing to abandon their former policies of 
economic self-sufficiency and participate in an international divi­
sion of labor*
In conclusionf this brief historical survey brings out two 
interesting facts* First, the two superpowers have traditionally 
displayed reluctance to engage in close economic relations* Mutual 
suspicion and fear of dependence —  for the West, on Eastern raw 
materials (especially fuels) and for the East, on Western techno­
logy —  koop involvement at a minimum* This could be a result not 
only of'the sheer size of domestic markets and resources but also 
the abstinence expected of the two "keepers of the faith*11 
Secondly, bipolar trade and intra-CMEA trade seem to inversely 
related; the expansion of the one has always occured at the expense 
of the other*^
The forms that technology transfer assume today are many 
and varied. I will divide them into four basic categories: co­
operation and exchanges, licensing, commodity trade and industrial 
cooperation.
Cooperation and Exchanges
Cooperation and exchanges in science and technology can be 
further divided into three basic categories. Simple information 
on science and technology con be exchanged through specific agree­
ments between governments. Until the mid-1970s individual EEC 
members could negotiate separate bilateral agreements. However, 
the rommon Trade Policy of the EEC put a stop to this in 1974; 
under the Common Trade Policy, any and all trade arrangements with 
a centrally-planned economy must be implemented by the European 
Community as a unit. When this became inconvenient, nations 
circumvented it by turning to Tong term economic, industrial and 
technical cooperation agreements.(EITCA)* An EITCA provides an 
"umbrella11 of government support for individual Western businesses 
that must deal with East bloc foreign trade organizations (FTOs). 
Although the specific terms (duration and provisions)vary from 
country to country, all EITCAs fulfill the basic function of 
allowing bilateral trade to exist de facto without benefit of 
formal bilateral trade agreements. Generally these agreements 
do not conclude specific business transactions; this is left to 
individual firms. The benefit of EITCAs lies in the establishment 
of cordial relations, the provision of guidelines for upcoming
Forms of Technology Transfer
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deals and, sometimes, the exchange of personnel,^ Another aspect 
of cooperation between governments consists of the joint economic 
and commercial commissions, which are a relatively recent develop** 
ment. They usually meet annually, often with ministers partici­
pating* These intergovernmental bodies serve as a bridge between 
market and centrally-planned economies* They forge institutional 
and personal links between trade officials and provide a forum 
to resolve disagreements, a channel for commercial communication 
and a means to identify potential troubles. Flexible working 
groups can concentrate on specific sectors if desired*2^
A second form of cooperation and exchange is visits by 
scholars to study, teach or research. As concern about the ef­
fects of sharing know-how has closed many business channels, the 
socialist governments have increased the number of "scholars" 
arriving in the West to study in such fields as semiconductor 
technology or computers. Of course, the amount of technology 
thus "leaked" remains extraordinarily difficult to quantify,2?
Lastly, private firms and Eastern g>vernments can also agree 
to exchange individuals. The Western firms often hope to gain a 
comparative edge over rival firms, access to new markets and/or 
benefit from Eastern experience in areas not as well developed in 
the U,S, Opinions on the success of these arrangements has been 
too varied to judge them. For the most part, they are considered 
to be of indirect value. These agreements are often stepping stones 
to further commercial deals, through which valuable technology 
flows are established. Private firms also frequently view cooper­
ation agreements as goodwill gestures that also put a foot in the
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door in case of future business deals. In 1972* a United Nations1 
study stated that BOk industrial cooperation agreements (JCAs) 
wore signed, 6.9 percent of which were scientific and technical 
cooperation agreements. Difficulties in separating scientific 
and technical cooperation from other ICAs* since the former are 
often fundamental parts of the latter* forced the U.N. to eliminate 
science and technology agreements as a separate category* However* 
the percentage of such agreements involving the U,3. reached 11,6 
percent in 1p?5* Even two years before, Germany1s share was 19 
percent,4 ’ These figures demonstrate that the importance of such 
agreements should net be completely disregarded,
Licensing
A second method of technology transfer is licensing, Li­
censing can be briefly defined as a Mstraightforward authorization 
to exploit an individual patent."2^ Some forms can even be con­
sidered examples of another category* industrial cooperation. The 
U.S.’s Economic Commission for Europe (EGE) has ruled that licen­
sing becomes a form of IC only when payment takes the form of the 
end product produced. This reasoning will be clarified when IC is 
surveyed separately. Licensing agreements accounted for 28 percent 
and 26 percent of all East-West trade in 1972 and 1975* respec­
tively. However, a strict application of the ECE definition lowers 
the figures which can be considered here to 1? and 18 percent.^
There are both advantages and disadvantages to licensing.
The advantages to the East are that domestic production is cer­
tainly cheaper (and less embarrassing) than importing from the
West* One expert, Josef Wilczynski, ^.stioated that coproduction
could a c c e l e r a t e  technological progress for a firm by one to two
years; the figure rises to three to five years if the know-how is
simply purchasedf i.e. complete factories* However, licensing
/ *
can leapfrog an industry by seven or eight years*"' Since the 
technology has been "tested", it is leas of a gamble and the spe- 
cdfic areas can be chosen to complement domestic P R* \) programs* 
Goods produced from Western guidelines are also often more pala­
table as exports to Western markets* Licensing arrangements can 
also be a boon to the Western firms if they lead to follow-up 
sales of spare parts, additional machinery or technical aid*
On the other hand, many socialist critics complain that, 
through licenses, Western enterprises are "dumping" obsolete, or 
soon-to-be obsolete, technology on unwary Eastern markets* Actu­
ally, this is as much a product of drawn out negotiations and lags 
in implementation by the buyers as unscrupulous business practices 
by the sellers. Another criticism is that licenses lead to lazi­
ness* Purchasing firms rarely, if ever, make any attempt to 
improve on the purchased technology, although this is due as much 
to systemic problems within the centralized economies as attitu- 
dinal problems. Nonetheless, licenses have offered no real, 
lasting solution to the technological gap.^2
Prior to the 1960s a great source of friction between East 
and West arose from what the West called "patent infringement" by 
the East* In other words, as a result of Western reluctance to 
share knowledge, as well as their own hard currency difficulties, 
Eastern governments were buying a Western good, taking it apart,
studying and copying it, 3y the IffO# both sides Sad recognised 
the advantages that purchasing licensee , had over this policy.
The Hast had discovered that not all the technology they needed 
could be simply dissected and then reproduced, such as computers
or plastics. Ill-will was being generated that could close market
for export;;, jn addn p-m, copying goods already being marketed 
in the West was ill verting time arid money as well as keeping 
Waster?, industries perma; ontly one step behind their Western coun­
terparts, For their part, Western induetrialists began to realize 
tdiey could make greater profits by selling their technology, 
especia1J y in areas that would probably not produce potential any 
rival a* Vhen lie ansi: s expanded in the 1960s the sectors in which 
licensee; were m *st in demand were those of traditional importance 
in an economy and heavily emphasized in Soviet planning: heavy 
industry, trornpoortation equipment and machinery, among others. 
However, ten years later this demand had shifted to developing 
areas, sue as electronics, light chemicals and plastics. With 
tue e)7ds, he social 1st nations also began looking beyond merely 
producing r"' -de to substituting fhr imports, They sought proceedures 
that would toad to exportable goods as wel 1,
Commodlty Trading
Commodity trading, a major transfer mechanism, is the im­
portation of rrudiinory, equipment or ports cither to produce new 
goods or t> sower the costs of production for existing goods. 
Commodity trade can assume two different shapes* One way, already 
mentioned, is to buy a few of whatever is needed, analyze them 
and reproduce them. The advantages to this method are that it
overcomes hard currency shortages and Westernreluctance.to share 
technology# It also offers the opportunity for the units to fee 
modified or improved upon to fit hotter into the production system# 
TOO disadvantage is thl it infringes on lestom patent fights#
Not only door thin create i’^wil1# t makeg it difficult to export 
these goods into Eastern markets, ' here is also a time delay in- > 
volved with such a moans of procurement. Socialist governments 
must wait far the goods to he produced and marketed in the West and 
then the lust Europeana must analyze the unit and set up their own 
production facilities. All this can produce a delay of four to 
ten years. Another disadvantage is that copying is limited to pro­
totyped whose principles are sufficiently well understood to take 
it apart and put it hack together. Difficulties arise in new and 
ever-changing fields such as electronics or chemical engineering.
Aiothwmethod of commodity exchange is simply to buj* all the 
neededrmachinery, etc. This method avoids the whole question of 
patent infringement, which makes the private firms happy. It also 
eliminates the delay for domestic study and research, which makes 
the Eastern governments happy. Oince technological improvements 
are, therefore, directly tied to the volume of imports, its effects 
are easier to quantify and measure and thus make the researcher 
happy. On the negative side, it is unquestionably more costly,^ 
Industrial Cooperation
Along with commodity trading, one of the most effective 
channels for technology transfer is industrial cooperation (IC),
As East-West trade developed, both sides began to see advantages
in closer involvement with one another. Industrial cooperation
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provided Western firms with access to raw materials, labor and 
new markets* By keeping their nfoot in the door" many firms hoped 
not only to encourage follow-up sales but also possibly to grool 
a cheap and reliable source of parts* On the other hand, the 
Socialist governments decided that such cooperation could ensure 
up-to-date methods and machinery, establish a contracted market 
for the produced items and therby also work to correct chronic 
hard currency deficits* As its title would suggest, there is no 
cut and dried definition for industrial cooperation. In its 
broadest sense, it can include almost all facets of Bast-West 
trade. This accounts for the difficulty in separating data on 
technology transfer from general trade statistics* Western ana­
lysts tend to define 1C as
The distinguishing characteristic of IC is precisely this long 
term nature as well as the reciprocity and mutual trust these 
arrangements necessitate.
Because it is Jess dependent on foreign trade overall, the 
Soviet Union genera U y has indulged I n industrial cooperation in 
the area of heavy industrial or investment goods. The Soviets 
also prefer purchasing entire plants to close involvement. Owner- 
ship by the Western firm, even a minority one, is forbidden.
East European governments, in contrast, have used industrial co­
operation agreements to develop their consumer goods sector and 
have generally preferred long term trade-oriented agreements that 
require a high degree of cooperation.-^ some Western firms remain
"*..a long term arrangement between firms 
which calls for a two way flow of resources 
technology and goods related to a sjgcif. 
ness activity, product or procese*,,*>5
wary of ICAs for a variety of reasons. There is a notaMe lack of 
conclusive evidence thet..new markets ar^# indeedf successfully 
being penetrated by cooperation agreements. Then, too, if ICAs 
became a widespread nhenomenon, ti ; , f course, no longer
provide on "edge” for inoi-lglu'g rirrru#
loonetjffio; 11*o levffj of inoootr;ioj o .o . < ration can be quite 
lowkey; that.in, here in only a sv--;. oe >*• o of interaction be- 
L'veen the partners. At Its most \ ' * consist of barter,
or counter-trade, agreements. A western fl^m may adept such an 
arrangement specifics.;!. iy for what Is aces;;: red in exchange, for 
example row material.'-. Or it may agree simply because there Is n 
°tn er way to cane : u a sal e, Counter- trod e is the preferred
veh.Lcl e of trade for the not ions of the /Soviet bloc, eastern 
-leaders see* gres1 advantages in this method because it circumvents 
the hard currency problem entirely, guarantees a market for the 
output ana discourage: the dost from ij :eg obsolete or inferior 
methc.dc: or ea’\ipment.
Come o t je r  ars e : t , wh1e\
and turnkey plants:. h.dcr turr
ITOVidcs,, so tu.at so] the new o
begin. i f  these nr*- oelements p
..rel etions and ps*. oenrt in Kind) ,
I>b-* 1 gy, turnkey i ] ost s mny be
o f  t r ’uu-fcrri ns t<>?r 1 • i f a t
entire product!or- ." 4 «,<.. :lnc
s truc tion and ±nit ia training
'lestern f i rms contract to: handie
>rm re for H' i r e  l icensing
t.s TT:
 least for tV:*. ^bore-term, dine© the
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(bef' re, during, and after production); this allown the plant to 
ue more neatly tailored to the respective needs of the country.
turnkey projects account for about a fifth of all IndustHnl co­
operation agreements, licenses slightly lesn.^
Ano t h e "  or* i . a f ; 
i. r a  t i  ng f the s o c  1 a \ J ,; t f  i r- 
■’TU* output  at a c o n t r a c t e d  
in return f o r  t e  i n i t i a l  a i d ,  
c o n t r a c t :  ng forms on ly  about 
O.ouri  shes  on whether o r  not 
TA# There art  two ■•ukI I vI o
i e ' o  i :  a hr o: t rac t i n g ,  In n ;  1 nt-
agrio^:; i our] 1 1 y flu bootem. firm 
h rl ce  t o r  o c o n t r a c t e d  l e n g t h  o f  time* 
vsh i t h e r  tong i  hi e o r i  n tan g i b j  c , ,1 a u**
7 p e r ce nt  o f  a l l  I C A s # ^  Debate o i l  
j o b - p r o c o s d n g  can be c o n s i d e r e d  on 
i o n s  to hob -pro cessLng*  The f i r s t  l
ndrawback” ; no import duty must be paid for imported f o r e i g n  good
• ■ ! n* i hey are for a product that will be re-exported, The 
second is "processing in bond"; goods may be exported to bo pro­
cessed and t)n*n r e - i m p o r t e d  * imported duty levels are based on th 
ch rige in value afterwards, not the total value* Naturally, job­
processing requires specific permission from the Eastern govern­
ment#^
Industrial cooperation can also assume more complex forma, 
such as coproduction. Coproduction, or specialization, Is usu­
ally a long term arrangement in which the production of the two 
partners is dependent on one another# Generally, each partner 
specializes in a different aspect of production* The good can b 
assembled by one partner, both  or sometimes distributed to suit- 
respective market demands* The Eastern partner usually makes an 
initial lump payment and then pays subsequent royalties* The 
finished ppmluct j r  often marketed jointly, whether under two
;O i i - aaa'." ^
grtv - trademarks or not. Sometimes subsenuent joirt P & P pro-
grama are initiated to deveii new prototypes# Hearty two-fifthB
of all ICAc take the form of coproduction# ^
A predecessor of today* a joint ventures, another complex .1CA 
were the concession;-; established under the So vie to* short-lived
lev; Ac j-nonic roiicy of the '9?.QnJ*3 Unlike ret'her forms, of I0t 
joint venture:- do -r!.ow the 7/estorn firm to own a share albeit
minority an-re —  of the undertaking. Nonetheless, the contra­
dictions this can expose in a socialist environment are obvious*
Aj though the -esters partner may not control more than A! percont,
it is not a * ways so Restricted an the hoard of directors. In any
case, if that 1 hy renchen i ts d e c ai 5n by connenrus, each .side
wieldf ■ a to p nver ail intest purposes. Oompa n..y figu re a
are express© 1 in iDrw-s 
the country are made 
©broad and domestic©,!
c 0 n 1 ri l *ut ion, .11 > w a v o r 
pari art are derived r 
The major differonce 
is fids l i e s  in  o w n e r a l l  
may 07.0 up to in ...ore
nsf a hara currency, although .payments within 
x:- the local, currency. Output is sold both 
oV# i to fits rro divided according to capital 
• Profits to b© repatriated by the Western 
Trm hard currency earnings from exports.l>i' 
between joint ventures in Seat fcurope and 
sns c0n tr0.1, # Ai th0ugh the Western partner 
°ni of tne enterprise and wield considerable
power ltj!- to 'Spec.i. fie contractual arrangements), it is limited 
JM 1 r't: *’* 1 ’ r ;i i!f course, the ultimate fate of the
^  ‘ iilv. ; r Ui' '.host r-veriuLcnt. In a d d i t io n ,  jg
is  r e l a t i v e ; ,  oruommon f , r t . t. , , u; or f prm 0 f  a KMC-- to r e c e iv e  i t s
 ^ 1 r ** ^he forma of output,as most Western partners
i! JfMnt vontllre-; d0* The many reasons for this practice are
___ __  ' i . U t U i
understandable; im, vc t:: xiity of socialist c urren^ieb, las tern 
balance of payments del0.0 1 1- , rei dting hard currency shortages, 
huge debts to Western banks, rampant and destabilizing inflation, 
Nevertheless, it is an important characteristic. Lastly, most 
joint ventures have nowhere near the scale or the scope of most 
MNC undertakings, one alone of the latter can involve many billions 
of dollars. By 1972, for instance, roughly 200 had been intiated 
over a ten-year period. The paid-in cumulative value of these was 
almost $2 billion,^ The share of joint ventures in IC is appro-* 
ximately one-fifth, though the number is growing.^
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Introduction
As has been demonstratedf technology trade is a very broad 
field. The very nature of technology is so fluid that it can 
assume many forms. The following presentation will attempt to 
remove technology transfer from the realm of the abstract and 
bring it into real-world situations. In many ways! the F#P#G, 
exemplifies the policy choices facing Western traders. It is one 
of the most stable and advanced of the European nations. The F,R,G 
is firmly tied to NATO and its Western allieS| yet its peculiar 
situation, i,e. its relations vis-a-vis East Germany, as well as 
economic drives, has led it to pursue an extremely active role in 
the East, How this policy evolved, how it balances precariously 
between th, hostilities ofthe Superpowers and how involved West 
Germany currently is in Eastern economies reflects and, perhapst 
focuses the trends and developments in technology transfer#
- volution of W>fit German Osthand"jn; \litik
It is worthwhile to first consider the evolution nf German 
( mthandelsno11tliu The policies adopted.by various regimes reflect 
specific reactions to the general forces in technology transfer 
(or trade in general) historically surveyed in part 1,
After .7, .V, II West Germany applied a social market economy 
(Gozlale Marktwlrtschaft) to the post-war shambles. The system 
advocated •♦social** or national development over private entrepre­
neurial profit. The social market economy not only helped the 
domestic economy but also resulted in an incredible increase in 
foreign trade, that is, exports. As a result, by 1958 West Ger­
many enjoyed the world* s third largest GNP# Before the war most 
of Germany*strade was directed to Eastern markets. However, after 
the war the focus shifted to the West; the East accounted for only 
5 percent of German exports, ^
Although the economic ties might have weakened, Eastern Europe 
and, specifically, the Soviet Union were never far from the West 
German spotlight. The first phase of West Germany*s Ostpolltik* 
as pursued by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1948-63)# had German 
reunification as its official goal. While this certainly was a 
major concern, Adenauer seems to have been at least as concerned 
about reassuring his Western allies (i,e, the U,S.) of the F,P,G.*s 
loyalty. His Politik der Stftrke (Policy of Strength) was definitely 
feseow-orientedl West Germany denied the legitimacy of the East 
European governments and, therefore, ignored them. The IV:\G, 
policy was also embodied in the Hallstein Doctrine, or
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Alleinvertretungaansnruch. According to this doctrine, since
Bast Germany was "illegitimate," only West Germany had the right 
to speak io.r the whole German people* Not only did the F,R,G* 
refuse to recognize the G.D.P* diplomatically, it extended this 
penalty to any state that did recognize the G * D * T h e  first 
test of the Hallstein Doctrine came in October 1957* when the 
F*£,G* discontinued its diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia after 
that country officially recognized Bast Germany*^ West Germany 
also continued to demand free all-German elections predicated on 
self-determination by the G,D*P,, or the "Soviet zone*" In gen­
eral, although Adenauer did eventually establish diplomatic rela­
tions with at least the U,S*S,R*, some analysts,such as Angela 
Stent, have termed his Ostoolitlk as rather passive and based on 
negative inducements.^ It should also be remembered that, hind­
sight aside, after W* <7, II the reunification of the two Germany*; 
was seen as a real possibility, In fact, in 1952, Stalin submitte 
a new proposal for reunification that included the important con­
cession of a German notional army. This offer was viewed as an 
attempt to sabotage Gorman participation in the European Defense 
Community (EDC)-and to exploit domestic German differed ceil on that 
organization. The proposal eventually stalled on the issue of free 
all-German elections# The idea of reuaifieatton was basically 
shelved, at least from the Soviet point^of-view, when teat Germany
c; iregained autonomy and subsequently joined NATO in 1955*
>>ince the teat German government', under the Hallstein Doc­
trine, refused to acknowledge the East European status, it could 
not officially negotiate trade agreements with them* The
p : f -
uc caiisachuss der deutschen Wirtschaft was designed in 1 9 5^ to 
conduct and promote East-West trade under the aegis of the Feder­
ation nf Qen iri 'ndustr;/ (,;andei;vorbatqd dor
• Naturallyi the ge7ern##flt took a keen and sup©rvisorla'- Interest 
in a l l  ' eaivi t i l / i e r e  .*"js no question that both
Chancellor Ader.'*uer and: Foreign Minister von Brentano linked ©do** 
nasties and pcJitic^v it - as eq\*©3 • y obvious.tifeich cam© first for
the F#P,G*' m- significant tra^e discussion until the ^German 
queatlcnM tr 'Iv** go*/ ?rmr,ont also mad© ©very effort not
to al if® its NA’ * of.ies e*/l to discourage large ©cal# participa­
tion by the business eeiwiunic ' vn what was# to officlalst a deli­
cate politic a ] matter. However* -although the continued
to press for more l«i$*libed trade, it did *o quietly a»i unobtru­
sively. The 4T':otest criticism came, not surprieihgly, fro* the
opposition part;,, the doelal Deaodyvt* (DPD), fh§ SI’D'S po«4tioh 
was that the strategic ewrbargo on the export bf ffftiifl food* %b 
the Soviet Union was ineffective because it had not produced any 
political change. They argued that increased economic ties with 
the U.S.S.W, and, indeed, the rest- of Eastern Kurope would, in the 
long run, produce more political and economic benefits for the F.P.O, 
They advocated a network of trade missions instead of formal diplo­
matic relations with Eastern governments* They w ere supported by 
the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the coalition partner of Adenauer's 
Christian Democratic Union (eDU),-^ For their part, the Soviets 
gave ample evidence that they were interested in talking about 
trade, not politics. Thus, the attempt to use linkage politics 
in 1955 was not very well-advised. For one thing, the extent of
trade was too small on either side to be an effective tool to 
shape politics. In addition, the economic stakes were nowhere 
near as important as the political ones involved| this imbalance 
precluded effective linkage tactics. Nonetheless, some progress 
was made, :in the latter part of 1955, chancellor Adenauer flew 
to Moscow for a summit meeting, Adenauer dwelt on the release 
of 9*623 German prisoners-cf-war* since the question of German 
reunification seemed to he - dead e^d at that point* After diown- 
-, . i, no.:jo ti ationn the cavietr- nprcfcd ' to rfio.sw. Hm r>risonefe in
exchange f r diplomatic recognition, Alorruor agreed-* despite
Paoipjecti )ns by other officials also presentf
In 1957 domestic factors encourage both the Soviet Union
and the F,R,G, to pursue a more flexible foreign nilicy towards 
each other. Adenauer was up far re-elecbjoni Khrushchev was try­
ing to ride out h i t de-Stalinianticu program as well as the Pantt* 
party11 plot, which was an unsuccessful attempt to depose (Chfucthchev* 
Although Khrushchev stressed the political beaefJtr of ^peaceful 
coexistence,« economics was also an important part, Jt is obvious 
that he considered foreign trade a critical ingredient for continued 
economic growth within the Soviet Union, The Soviet government 
appealed to both German businessmen and German officials to encour­
age a hr ade agreement. Despite this* Khrushchev had m  intention of 
budging on the issue of German reunification, Gtill* the two sides 
agreed .to meet to. discuss a trade agreement, The Soviets entered . 
the 1 9:?d summit with the intention of separating politics and 
trade as much as possible. Their main objective was a long-term 
trade agreement to help their economy and remove the East from
38
0 u u wnr ir*o: ‘ition. •rrvihS5f on the other handj  had m
* u  ■ t;'
l > - ' )t: '* "’ 'i o ; lit* pmnreno on
ei ' tno •■* ;t;! in f the
Vi ’ ■ ‘ « r - a e Tie-; t t in-*-, t
t :  Cidf-:; ! f 1 t ;* c 11 of .1 nc reared
-v v*er -f o f
;ncfc-.:-a, trade D r  n fmrnrahl» nettloment,
* f,;r'|;"-in ■’n thf ■ i -Ufr Jut ,nfl-
n« Since the qui-.st | nr
ra ircnort nit but fit 'vnrri iin-'l y rrtttcnl, t he iinlrme
?1 !K' v D t  .f Tcfi to
rf' con-oLoorcd German.-; before 21 ,luno 1-MI.
r i.t n >t,» j.nv'lt v i nr.' r* i o i.tj 1 bo,
red notion rtetuo, 
tionr: of the- print- 
•’ in, ontii eldo.o|
er.LIn fnr its symbolic
' t f ' l 1 ;
1 ' :ur.:, el;
if fbO.n I
! - : , l J ‘
• r ‘ ' ; 01 V:{\ ■ tier tt a y
n: tee- - . ; i - t ■hi:!an inifc : y. *t
f • t h ' - > * -O'li V Oii'rj OV <'T>- :
. or ■ ■ ' i ; ■ r- re ■ . r -o: on t oei-joci ■ f .t. — .* . t.
- , c.-i.an, ■ t i Lilt *- ■. 0 ■ - r o •l .* J i
? .■ t y t :■; , brv-l -\ q *: - . *f y* f * >oe-- t vi b otntn- o f
- uo U7 rc- 7 0*;! : t ■ ' • f the to 1 Dermnn r; to too on
* t ■ r !; : ■' 'n ’hi l cl reined h z!.t ■ t * ; r'*t I'-er^ ir
or !' - - ■ ■'•rt of t*w € II• • * i, t * . .v* ; f i n^ (;verf ui-
.. ‘J ie.-t si,: .".'I ,r. in o,n o Conn to-j.il t *• 're.it not ->n; y t
V* j £ . • y | • . « ”or;ricnt 1'0it j • t/,0 1 0 ;it. r.r‘c.y -f ' /•: t
1 > I'Cf'b 1 -l- -* . r' ; t*"- Pi: : j.„ * t-!r t ,;f_ •*; ’ >'«.
T" d i' ’■ 4'- qu .j • -p i, - - 1. • > ; - v',: r J.v-
■' J ■ ■ ( O -7 "* • 7 ; -O " t . -: *- * 1 ■ •r ■ - . „ 4- ‘ r. ^V • ,s. J n.. 0 r* , c 'me cm-'.
'in t i n  ; tf  • ! t , *  - r  L-- 7 u :•; • U i V  1
39
a! oiu.y; that tr, Great Britain,
''Ke/mu, 'eimm. me i Germany a ad n ' to
i ho- c o.tm.p et far the ’ jr{ 1n ;.1. tuatl
aovy 0a 1 to-. ea a err ef t. v or.
:mtf the /Omul. !s; ion ti: rent ■ -net to
V i t. ‘ t ’»i < { ’ ; P „, w • - • * • • • y la mo m-'t fieri, in
posted that ! .;v- . bo ta ru* .1 r. to
• city.*'  aimmnehm’ :.e ninot that
-a thi-; r ip h r t-- : r . i m  t Bar i n,
trance, the ?j%$# and the
rignt.n iri We at 'Berlin* 
van a note Khrushchev sud-  
B7 Movemhoj* *953. In this
'J *- •* * ^ e a s e p a r a t e peace 
f l  from tne West, and * u g -  
.m tari;mi f denat ion a l ised
too * extern powers no longer 
sir-rc rA.oy hod "grossly vio-
,L ' ■ t  ’?' 1,f .• *' ' 0 P. • ‘ ;;" r ':' '■ .a Q fj
’.v ’ tli'"iron mem ^ i ] y .'g thin
: ’ o v i e t !: n i ;»n j r d t. h e .}. •. ■ e
5* :• o ' ‘-Ggr 'tod tht the Western powers
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am oil i 4 only forced? Hie re may have been a
variety of factors. Khrushchev, of course, wanted a final settle# 
w  nt and r^r/oamc for the G. D.( . and the lest of Postern Kurope# 
it also could have been a. last ditch effort to stir up trouble be­
tween Germany and her Westarn dLlies. Or Khrushchev could have delib 
ately phrased it to raise Bast-West tensions to such a state that 
some wander!ny Marxist- wninist sheep, such as Yugoslavia or China,
would hopefully be
Khrushchev!s hopes*
won] a be ineJa.'icdir 
1957 u federal bank
forced back into the socialist fold# Whatever 
they were natvfer cospletely realized. West Berlin 
• 1 ; "Weat Germsn in tcreational agreements. In
?m official!:/ included West Berlin in the Ger-
nan deutsch mark {j>M) currency area. In 1958 the Soviets agreed 
t trade with the entire i>M area. West Berlin was not specifically
mentioned, but it was tacitly included. Probably fcr this reason, 
the Soviets would only commit themselves verbally to the concept 
of the DM area. This policy was publicized when German and Soviet 
delegations met to renegotiate the 1958 trade*greement. Although 
the Berlin issue shadowed the negotiations, the Germans announced 
a new settlement on 9 December 1960. At the official signing cere­
mony von Scherpenberg, the head oflfc* German delegation, presented 
his Soviet counterpart with -,r. agreement which included the state­
ment that the new agreement -id apply to the same area as the
1958 agreement, namely t.V “ re DM area. .Vost Berlin was not
specifically mentioned, less, shocked at what they saw ru;
a cheap trick to force th- in question, the Soviets argued far
two hours and left, leaving v  document unsigned. After both sides 
had issued a rublic ctatern nt, 'n their respective positions, a com­
promise wan reached and s i g n i n  31 December 196O, The new agree­
ment involved the previous " r > of applicability” (Anwendunms-
£e£2i2k) as opposed to "area of validity,” This seemed to satisfy
56German as well as Soviet nc» :•> iiities.
The second phase of liormrn ostpolitik was much more flexible 
and active* '^his new approver was put into practice by Chancellor 
ludwig Erhard (1963-6) and n * •nued through Chancellor Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger (1966-9). Althou •.rmany still refused to diplomati­
cally recognize most Cast :* 01 states, with the ex:option of
Romania, it abandoned it. c w-orientation and attempted to 
establish separate ties w„ eh nation through trade missions* 
Based on informal bilateral t , which would hopefully lead to
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political concessions, this policy of »bric|pe-building1* was 
grounded on two premises. First, the size and strength of the 
tVest German economy would eventually overwhelm the reluctance 
of East European governments. Second, as the apparent loosening 
of the Soviet hold on Astern Europe continued, West Germany1 s 
ability to successfully link political remands with economic agree­
ments would increase accordingly* This emphasis on bridge-building 
led Kiesinger to abandon a strict interpretation of the Hallsteln 
Doctrine in favor of the so-called birth defect theory (Geburts- 
fQhlertheorie). This new theory maintained that the Eastern govern­
ments were so dominated by Moscow that they had no choice but to 
recognize the G,D,P# and reject the F,P,G, The new position ful­
filled a variety of purposes, Jt opened the option of recognizing 
the governments of Eastern Europe (except the G,I),P, of course) 
without in any way ratifying the status quo. The mood between the 
F,R,G, and the U,3.s,p, was not quite as hostile as la fore. However, 
Moscow viewed those new initiatives with increasing dismay,^
Under Kiesinger1 s Grand Coalition of the CDU and SPD in 
1966, former West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt became Foreign Minister* 
Under his influence, Ostpolitik was launched into its third phase, 
which continued through the Chancellorships of Brandt and Schmidt* 
Brandt1s then press chief and later his special assistant, Egon 
Bahr, developed the new policy of tfWandel durch AnnHherung*1 or 
Mchange through rapprochement*1*
The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated to the West 
Germans that the Soviets had established definite limits on the
independence of its last European satellites. The effectiveness 
of bridge-building reached an impasse; Moscow returned to its 
place as a focal point of Germany's Ostpolitik.
Germany finally accepted the status quo in Mast Surope 
and abandoned its meinvcrtretungsansi,ruch. ,n ,968 Brandt
that aer!7nn reunification v,a« no loncor n precondition 
lor a rooty, uhe new theory propos, g working for- the best possible
rein tione with th' f,A, ♦ • t je P, arid t>w> rest of Eastern
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o f  »o:G .V-rUn ir. a irnaty, Gorman credit  a v a i la b i l i ty  for  the 
Gusrinnr., i r y r t  r e s t r ic t }  ms on both ,-idor. After the w.,r lowers 
treaty o f  V , . ,  >Gjj.v «  ii.i,Aj..i,/ r a t i f ie d  the post-war status ouo, 
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tvitvud lone 
nation* Thin agreement v:aa foil owed
19?A was signed in
;/ another in u)73$ this one 
lasting ten years and involving economic, industrial and technics 
cooperation. This agreement, especially those parts relating to 
technology transfer, represented now hope for both parties.
Another— similar— ten-y oar pact was reached in t97fl and then 
modified at the 1980 Rrezhnev-Schroidt summit in Moscow.60
‘sM' i’-ii’5 » ;; ■ ■; yyyjy d‘> s*k
The F.P*G.1s relationship with the two Superpowers has 
exerted— -and continues to exert— *a strong influence on German 
Qsthandelspoiltik» The two very different policies each power 
would prefer the r*P*G, to pursue keep Gorman Ostpolitik in a 
continual state of tension* On the one side, there is the U*S*, 
representing security interests of the Western Alliance, which 
distrusts too close of a bond with the Hast bloc. The pressures
A
on the West Germans to maintain good working relations with the 
Soviet Union in the Hast, because the U.S.S.P. is the key for the 
East as well as the importance of Soviet trade.
Up until the 1970s, West German foreign policy in general, 
but especially its Ostnolitik. was conducted only with America’s 
stamp of approval. In 1949 the U.S. pushed through "CoCom" to 
administer the 1948 strategic embargo against goods to the Bast 
bloc, an embargo which hit the F.R.G, especially hard. The Rattle 
Act of 1951 empowered the U.S. to cut-off economic and military 
aid to countries in Western Europe that refused to comply with the 
embargo. Trade agreements with Eastern Europe (except the U.S.S.T?,, 
Romania and Albania) were negotiated for the F.R.G, by the Allied 
Joint Export and Import Agency until the Paris agreements in 
October 1954. ^ 1 After establishing broad outlines for East-West 
trade with the formation fo CoCom, the American policy has generally 
been non-involvement in Germany's East-West trade agreements, A
Osthandelspolitik between the Superpowers
44
®ajor~aad controversial--exception to this was a “NATO” embargo 
on largo diameter steel pipes to the Soviet Union# Basicallyt it 
was a U,S, order. Although the contracts had already been signed 
Germany complied; Britain did not and picked up German contracts. 
This raised a furor in the business communityt Businessmen were 
enraged, since they felt they bore the brunt of the embargo for 
all of Europe; the Soviets threatened to sue. However “delicate" 
the situation was, Bonn probably felt it was choosing the lesser 
of two evils; Germanyfs guarantor needed to be humored. The em­
bargo was eventually abandoned. Further, as it turned out, the 
CoCom strategic embargo lists, as a (roup, were so drastically
altered an' restricted in 195  ^ ami then in 1953 that it really
A ^did not limit Covict-German trade to any great extent,0' Never­
theless, CoCom continues to be perceived as an American tool to 
control and limit European competition in European competition in 
Eastern markets. The major complaint of the west Germans, and 
most Europeans, is not the existence of CoCom but that American 
decisions are reached too slowly and too inconsistently. There 
should be clear-cut rules and regularized channels for appeals.
(U,S.) Grain as well as (European) machinery should be included 
and China or Eastern Europe should receive the same treatment no 
the Soviet Union.^
The same bftte noire arose in 1982, once again involving 
pipelines. An economic summit was held at Versailles in June,
The Europeans believed that a dual strategy had finally settled 
the matter: the U.S, would allow Europe to fulfill its contract
obligations for Siberian pipeline unhindered# In returnf the 
Europeans would work with the U,S, to limit additional credits 
to the Soviet Union# Unfortunately, shortly after the summit, 
on 18 June 1982, President Reagan expanded what was purely an 
American commercial embargo to include foreign holders of Ameri* 
can licenses. This vas a severe blow to many businesses, some of 
which were counting on the profits from Eastern contracts. For 
instance, one such West German company, A,B,G, Telefunken (through 
its subsidiary A,E,G, Kanis) was depending on a 650 million DM 
contract with the Soviet Union for 4? turbines. The turbines 
required a license from General Electric during production and 
were, therefore, affected by the American order* Twenty-four hours 
after the U,S. decision, the company officially stated that thou­
sands of German jobs were in p e r i l T h e  U,S, took such a drastic 
step out of frustration v/ith what it viewed as the complete lack 
of forceful reactions by the Europeans to the events in Poland,
While European actions did not rise to American hopes, it is in­
correct to say Europe, at least the Germans, did nothing. Although 
the Bonn government did not cancel commercial agreements already 
signed, on 1? February 1982, it did announce a variety of political 
signalsM directed towards the Soviets in response to the crackdown. 
Official Soviet or Polish activity was limited in West Germany and 
West German official visits with either of these two countries was 
curtailed. Existent scientific, technological and shipping agree­
ments were fulfilled to the letter but no further; negotiations
get
for additional agreements were broken off, ^ This incident clearly
demonstrates that In the course of strategic goods and technologies 
which the Ut;h defines very broadly, the U.3, is quite prepared 
to intervene and politicize the issue* Because the P.R.G* is so 
obviously dependent on the U»5# for its defense, Bonn must walk 
» very fine line between American wishes and the ties with the 
East necessary to maintain good relations w: ;h East Germany* That 
me ms that, somehow, the Soviet Union must also be considered*
Economic relations betv/een the Soviet 
Union ami the Federal republic of Germany are 
too important for cither side to allow them 
to be affected by political or military issues,
- dor Tagessniel^0
In general the Soviet press has alternated between sharply 
criticizing the "vengeful!n and 1 diitant" policies of West Ger­
many and stressing the importance of increasing East-West trade to 
further peaceful coexistence* Historical references to past trea­
ties was a favorite tool. Political benefits from trade were men­
tioned more than economic ones. Writers emphasized that the real 
impetus for formalized East-West trade came from a desperate Ger­
man business community.0*'7 Another definite characteristic of 
Soviet policy since 1953 has been an unswerving attempt to put as 
much distance as possible between the II,S* and the F*P*G* Were 
a wedge to be driven between 'West Germany and the U*S*, the U,S*S*B. 
might find itself in a very uncomfortable position* On the one 
hand, they would eertainly like to remove all U*S. influence in 
Europe, on the other hand, were that to happen* the F.&.G. as 
well as other countries, would probably increase their own defense 
levels, a now EDO might even bo established. As a dominant
eoonomic power,and, probably, a allitary rower as wall under such 
a scenario, Germany would begin to sssume c more active and (most 
likely) dominant rola in all aspaots of Buropoans Ooanunity affairs 
Thin oould hardly be a more appealing situation for tho U.S.S.R.
The political game between the P.R.Q. and the Soviet Union is vary 
complex.
Tho U.S.S.R. is not only politically important* it has 
boooao an important trading partner of Germany as well. Of course, 
whan the 1958 trade agreement was signed, Oerman and Soviet busi­
nesses found it to be limited for both political and econoaie 
reasons. Politically, the Oerman government still refused to 
guarantee credits, whieh made them difficult to proeure. On the 
other hand, the inconvertibility of the ruble was oreating eoonomic 
difficulties in fulfilling import wishes. The soviet exports were 
insufficient for all the goods they wanted to import from Germany. 
The Soviets claimed that the trouble was really due to Oermany 
forcing unfairly low priees on Soviet exports, notable graint in 
other words, with such low priees a tremendous amount would have 
to be exported to accrue enough hard ourrenoy to pay for expensive 
imports.^0
Politically, the environment for teohnology sales to the 
Soviet Union tended to be affected by the Soviet flexibility (or 
lack thereof) over the status of Berlin* more recently, the tri­
angular relationship between the U.S.S.R., the People's Republic 
of China and West Germany* and, of course, the degree of tension 
betwien; thi Superpowers.  ^ seonooioally, affairs have proceeded
nor* smoothly. Th* West Germans recognised th* nso*salty of 
credit to fill hard ourrenoy gap* in th* Bast* rather than di­
rectly subsidising credits— a* achieved as a result of high fuel 
prices and lower soviet demand for Geraan goods.
Table At Soviet Trad* (in Percent)?1
Wltlh,dflrBiflt with West
Soviet figures for I98I showed the volume of trade with west 
Germany to be about 6 billion rubles or 17 peroent of Soviet- 
Western trade. Five peroent of all of Moseow's inports (15 per­
cent of those just from the West) were German produots. Germany 
reoeived 6 peroent of all soviet exports (21 peroent of those 
destined for the West). Although Soviet trade with Japan and the 
United States dropped 16 peroent in 1983, trade with West Europe 
rose 6A percent.?2 in the first half of 1983 trade between the 
P.R.G. and the U.S.S.R. rose by nearly 50 percent.?’ Part of 
this trade shift has been directly traced to larger soviet pur­
chases of European industrial technology. The Soviet Union pur­
chased 15.5 percent more industrial technology from the West in 
1983. The total value was approximately 09 billions $2.5 billion 
of this originated in West Germany.?**
Soviet and P.R.G. exports and imports basically lie at 
opposite ends of the production eyol*. Soviet exports eonsist 
largely of energy1 77 peroent of all trade to the West Germans is
Imports
Exports 21
15 5
6
in the form of fuels. In 1980 West Germany purchased one-fifth
of all exported Soviet natural gas as well as 9 percent of Russian
crude oil and petroleum produets. Energy imports from the Soviet
Union are ealoulated at ? percent of energy imports and about b
percent of general German primary energy demands. There have been
ges-for-pipe deals since 19?3i fuels from these are now 17 percent
75of total German natural gas consumption. West Germany exported 
approximately S3.9 billion to the Soviet Union in 1982. This 
level represents 38.1 percent of all German exports to European 
CMEA countries, which is b.3 percentage points higher than 1981 
levels. bZ.H percent of all of Germany*s Eastern imports originated 
in the Soviet Union. This is an increase of b.3 percentage points 
from 1981. Overall volume of trade is approximately $b.5 billion.?* 
West German exports to the Soviet Union have been dominated by 
steel and machinery products, especially pipes (for transporting 
fuel). In 198O 30 percent of all imported pipe was West German-
i
made. This maker the P.R.G. very important in a key sector, since 
soviet export potential is so closely linked t* possible fuel 
sales. West Germany also provided 3b percent of imported machinery 
in 1981.77
The U .S .S .R .  holds German lioenses for axis-burners for 
nuelear power stations, furnaces for burning sulphur, herbioides, 
eleetrieal equipment and wedge presses.7® One project still being 
slowly worked out involves a 916.5 billion order from the Soviet 
Union for German synthetic fuel plants. Payment would take the 
form of energy deliveries.7? nearly fb.5 billion worth of Soviet
goods were imported by Germany in 1982, a llttlo below !ialf Of 
all its imports from the East. 10 Included in these figures,
West Germany does import some technology too. The P.R.G. has 
purchased steel and pharmaceutical proeedures from the soviet 
Union. The U.S.S.R., together with the G.D.R., sold Salsfitter 
Industriebau a license for a low-density polyethylene production.
By itself, the Soviet Union has exported at least 18 metallurgical, 
ohemioat and electronic licenses, fet, overall, the ration between 
the P.R.G. and the U.s.s.R. for technology exports stands at 10
Rilfctttta wltt swttrn fiuropt
While Germany's economic relations with the nations of 
Eastern Europe are heavily influenced by its relations with the 
two Superpowera, the nature of the relationships are not identical. 
Por one thing, Kastem Kurope does not haws the lungs denestie 
economy and fund of raw aatarials to fall beok upon as the soviet 
Onion does. Like West Germany they are very dependent on foreign 
trade. Although the transfers taking plaee to each eemntry might 
be overshadowed by relations with the U.S.S.R., when considered 
as a group, they reveal an impressive network of ties.
Although Kastem Kurope is undesirably influenced by 
the U.S.S.R. in ohoosing the tenor of relations with the West, it 
is evident that East European economies rely nueh mors heavily on 
trade with the West than either the soviet Union or even their 
Western partners. Por instance, 5 peroent of total BIG trade iO 
with the cmba, but 25 peroent of OIBA trade involves the IBB.®*
Proa 19?o«l982 East-West trade stabilised and, in some oases, 
declined. Western export levels deellttod to 2.9 in 1982 from 3*4 
in 19?9i imports shifted only 5.0 to 5.3 percent.8-* As a result 
of the continuing global reeessiwt and inflation,.both Bast and 
West decreased trade with the other. Sines the Mst fSSttiOtsd 
its western imports by 21 peroent and the West only by 5 percent, 
the Bastern balance showed a $5 billion surplus in 1982. He hard 
ourrency seemed also helped the Blstera states to trim $8.6 hll|j|g|
off their external debt, bringing It down to $62 billion* Zn 
1980, out of all OBCD exports to the Beet, roughly 21 percent 
were fro* the F.R.O. alone. This made West Germany the aost 
eoonoaioally important Western aotor in Bast-West trade.®^  In 
1982 the P.R.G. was still the doainant aotor froa the West.
$10.b billion worth of iaports were purchased by the Bftiti the 
West Oeraans bought $10.2 billion in return. Those figures in­
clude P.R.G.-G.D.R. trade. However, since 1973 Osmans have ex­
ported acre (in sheer quantity; to the soviet Union than to the 
G.D.k.i they also have iaported more froa the G.S.S.R. So even 
if the O.D.R. were ignored, the P.R.G. would continue to lead in 
CMEA trade. West Germany exported aore than $7.5 billion to the 
other CMEA oountries, itself iaporting $7*7 billion.®®
The percentage of joint ventures out of all Goman-Bast 
Bloo cooperation is small but gorwingt oooperatien in third aarkets 
aoeounts for 7 percent 1 job-prooessing aakes up 10 percent. Co­
production is involved 7 pOroent of the tiae. Sixteen percent of 
Goman Industrial cooperation was based on specialisation.®? West 
German agreements on specialisation usually speeifieally restriet 
the Eastern partner to domestic aarkets, other Socialist oountries 
or (occasionally) Third World aarketst the Oeraan flm is not thus 
Halted. The Oeraan brandnane is frequently used in the Wsst» 
either the Oeraan one or a ooabined brandnaae is marketed in the 
last.®® Most foras of cooperation, bo. 3 percent to be exact, take 
the fora of licensing agreements.®? About bo percent of all Oeraan 
licensing arrangements involve long-tern cooperation and in an
equal percentage of the instances the P.R.O. supplies Machinery. 
Supplementary services such as additional documentation* technical 
personnel and/or agreements to pass on new innovations in the 
licensed area take plaoe 7 out of 10 times. Approximately 80 
percent of German lioenming ventures include quality oontrol ar­
rangements , though only half limit the quantity to be produced. 
Payment by the East is usually in hard eurrenoy, generally in a 
lump sum, though 20 pereent of the time, payment takes the form 
of the endproduot. Seventy peroent of the lleenees allow the 
Eastern nation to export the goods, usually to other Socialist 
governments.
In East Europe the P.R.O. has used licenses to sell waste 
incineration procedures to Czechoslovakia, produotion methods for 
engines, oolor TVs, washing machines, oheaieals and windows to 
Hungary. Poland purehaaed licenses for high pressure safety valves 
eonerete mixers and shoes.Many tines simple commodity trading 
oan later blossom into more complex Industrial oooperation. In 
1978, Volkswagen sold East Germany 10,000 Rabbit ears for eoal and 
heating oil, bicycles and automotive components. VW is currently 
negotiating with East Germany for an engine assembly plant) the 
engines produoed would be sent back to the West in exchange for 
VW light trueks. The Soviet union has also approached VW about 
licenses for diesel engine produotion to be used at the Moscow 
Automobile Works.
out of the East European eountrlee, Hungary is the most 
involved in industrial cooperation projects. Most agreements
involve snail or mtddle-sised firm, not tho largost onot. Slnoo 
foreign trade accounts for approximately one-third of Hungary**
ONP, the government has made great efforts to eneourage and faci­
litate projects with the East. The relative decentralisation of 
the Hungarian bureauoraey dealing with foreign trade has greatly 
aided this flexibility.93 in 1932 Hungary reeeived a little less 
than $1.1 billion worth of goods froa West Germany. This 10*? per­
cent of all of the P.R.O.'s exports to the CUBA. The trade level 
refleets a deorease of I.03 percentage points froa 1971.
Bulgaria's unusually close ties to the Soviet Union have 
influenced official thinking to something less than unbounding 
enthusiasm for cooperative ventures with the West. Following the 
soviet lead, joint ownership by Western firms is illegal in Bul­
garia. Bulgaria's share of Germany's exports to the CUBA, valued 
at $507.6 million, remained about the same at 5 peroent.
Czechoslovakia decreased its share a little under a per­
centage tpoint. The value of its trade dropped $8?.6 million to 
$802.8 million. Poland's share of German-CMBA trade fell to 8.7 
peroent from 9*95 peroent. Poland imported Id.8 million less from 
West Germany) 1982 levels stood at 883.2 million.
bastly, Romania took the deepest plunge. As the volume 
of trade plummeted from 8d*5,h million to 37d.8 million in 1982* 
its percentage share also sartk around 5 percentage points to 3.71 
peroent. The only country, other than the Soviet Union* to have 
inereased trade with West Osrmany was Bast Germany, up I.33 per­
centage points to 25.87 peroent of trade.
F.R.G. Exports^
(in Millions) Percentage Share
1 M 1  1082 1081 1082
Hungary 3,17*3.6 1,086.0 Bulgaria 500.4 507.6 Cseohoslovakia 890.4 802.8 Poland 960.0 881.2 Romania 868.4 176.8 O.D.R. 2,466.9 2,626.7
12.0
M8.9
24.5
10.7
Muoh of tha deoline in tha East was due, not to shrinking 
demands but to shrinking funds. The recession and debt repayments 
all out the amount of available hard currency, forcing many nations 
to deorease exports. The continuing expansion of inter-Oeaan 
trade has provided much of the momentum for the F.R.G.»s Oethandel. 
The relationship between these two states is a unique one on the 
world market and deserves to be considered in a little more detail.
"Trade in a tine of tension provides a firm basis for stable development in the political sphere. Relations between the German Oemooratlo Republic and the Federal Republic are on an upward trend." o<- firloh Honeoker, Pres, of G.D.R.*3
In tlmyears following w.w. II, Adenauer's poliey was to 
deny the separate existenee of an Bast German state. Bast Germany 
was oonsistently referred to as "the Soviet some" and, diplomat!* 
eally, it was ignored. In aoeordanee with tills philosophy, the 1951 
Berlin Aooord established a Traiihandatelle den ImtoitwiriairtT 
Clearing Office for Inter-tonal Trade, to handle ooamereial rela­
tions between the two. The F.R.G. finally reeognized Best Ger­
many— for instanoe, calling it a "government" instead of "bureau" 
or "ministry*--and set aside its official priority of reunifloation 
with the Four Powers Agreement of 1972. tinder the terms of the
5?
Qrundvrtrs*. or Basle Treaty, Bom officially reeognleed tho 
bordar with Bast Oeraany. Tha apaoifioation that this border 
was subjeet to change if an Inter-Geman or all-Kuropeans arrange- 
nant wara to ba worked out baeama known as tha "European clause.“ 
Instead of ambassadors, tha two states agreed to ecehange "perma­
nent representatives.• Thus, lnter-Geman trade is etill offioially 
oategorised as Biwnanhendai. or intrastate trade.
The representatives of the Treuhandstelle, in addition 
to individual working committees, meet twiee a month to diseuss 
and negotiate trade deals, loans or payment schedules.*” The 
Trauhendsteila functions within a paradoxioal system of regula­
tions. Unless speoifioally exoepted, all teohno.'.ogioal exports 
are forbidden. Naturally, CoOom restrictions apply to the G.D.R. 
as well. On the other hand, for politieal reasons. Vest Germany 
insisted that Bast Germany be eligible for the same tariff privi­
leges as West Germanyi the G.D.R., therefore, enjoys assoeiate 
status. Since trade between Bast and West Germany is oonsidered 
intrastate trade, no external tariff need be paid. This situation 
has led disgruntled observers sareastioally to number VC membership 
at ten-and-a-half. The relationship is additionally disturbing to 
those who consider the G.D.R. to be a dangerous and uncontrollable 
leak of valuable goods and technology (especially sinoe technology 
is so fluid, by its very nature) to the vast Bloc. The West Osmans 
of course, deny this. Advocates of neither side have been able to 
produce conclusive evidence.*?
Developments in reoent years have brought about renewed 
tensions between the two Superpowers. Yet, despite a Soviet return
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to a hard lino, the East Gomans havo boon working to koop inter- 
Goman relations as rolaxod as possible. Anong other things, 
Honeoker has kept the tenor of language mild, spoken reassuringly 
of future East-West Euromissile Arms Control negotiations, in* 
eroased the number of family visits (up bo pereent in 1963 to 
60,000} and turned the management of Berlin's ailing surfaoo 
rapid transit system (S-bahn) over to West Berlin for a yearly 
rent of 100 million DM.?* The eraekdown in Poland aetually nay 
havo helped Bast Germany, in some respeots. Mooeow is anxious 
to maintain the stability of suoh an eeononioally and militarily 
important state. In this respect, the G.D.R. my get nore room 
to maneuver.?? Although East Germany is raising part of the Wall' 
by 3 feet to 16 feet, Honeoker has authorised the removal of booby- 
trapped shotguns along the border. 00 Emigration barriers are also 
coming down. Although 50 to 60 people are usually allowed to emi­
grate daily from the G.D.R., this figure jumped to 100 a day in 
February of this year.1,0* Overall, the flow of emigres has inoreased 
10 timest more than 5000 left between the 18th of February and the 
first week of March this year.102 Communication ties are also 
improving. In 1982 West Germany paid $35 million for inter-German 
postal and telegraph services. However, starting in 1983 (and 
lasting until 1990), the oost rose $80 million a year for service 
improvements. The new "technology" will bo used to speed up the 
mil, improve the reliability of postal delivery, ease Import 
rules, improve direot-dial telephone links and establish additional 
telex and telephone lines.10^
Inter-German trade increased lb percent in the firct Half 
of 198I, although the increase was only 8 percent in real terns. 
Overall volume was about 6.8 billion OH ($2.5 billion). This in­
crease was due not only to improved relations between the two 
states, but also to the Bast Osman policy ef limiting imports 
from other countries book to the F.R.O.10* In 1982 West Germany 
exported mere than $2.6 billion to Bast Germany. She O.D.R. thus 
accounted for 25.9 peroent of all West German exports to the Bast, 
basically where it had been the year before. Imports from the 
G.D.R. remained proportionately the same. The total of $2.7 billion 
accounted for 26.2 percent of total Eastern imports.*®* By the 
end of 1982, the market value of total inter-German trade had 
reaohed Ik billion DM ($3b billion). The O.D.R. trimmed $1.5 billion 
of its hard currency debt of $12.5 billion. It tamed to West Ger­
many for more of its imports— 16 peroent more. This signalled a 
29 peroent inerease in chemical goods, 73 peroent more agricultural 
produots and a 97 percent rise for iron and steel imports.
Trade between the two states hit $3 billion by June 1983. West 
Germany's exports increased 33 peroent, although its Import! from 
the G.D.R. rose only 2 peroent. 107 Compared to west Germany's 
overall level of international trade of only 2.3 peroent ill 1983, 
inter-German growth was 8.5 percent, an inerease to about 95*9 
billion. Nearly two-thirds of all East Germany's Western trade 
oeours with West Germany..
Financial ties exist as well. Bast Germany was bulks 
in the West approximately $6.3 billion.108 one option span te
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the G.D.R. through Wost Germany is swing credit. "Swing credit" 
is an interest free loan, existing mostly for the G.D.R.'s benefit, 
although technically available to either partner. The fund la 
usually set at 150 million DM.10^  In 1983 bom guaranteed a loan 
of one billion DM ($385 million) to the O.D.R. This largesse is 
considered to be a key factor in the oontinue thaw in relations.11® 
Traffic between the two states is active. To be fair, 
not all goods and services flow from West to bast. Volkswagen 
purchases heavy presses and other machinery. Siemens A.G., an elee* 
trical company, buys components and other goods valued at $15-20 
million a year. Applknees and components are purchased by A.E.Q. 
Telefunken. Mannesmann, a steel pipe company, receives steel and 
non-ferrous metals. As of next year, a West German plant-building 
company, Lurgi, which sold East Germany technology for oil refin­
eries near Leuna, will market 500,000 tons of East German methanol 
in the F.R.G.111 A few years ago Hoeehst-Unde, a chemioal firm, 
closed a deal with East Germany to build a $500 million ohemioal 
plant, with 25 peroent of the PVC and caustic soda produced exported 
to West Germany.112 At the Leipeig trade l$4ir held in the beginning 
of March 1984, West German firms announoed various oontraots for 
industrial cooperation. Volkswagen will provide East Germany with 
trucks and an engine-assembly plantt the engines produced will 
serve as payment. Also, East German steel will be rolled into 
sheets by West Goman firms. Raw materials, semifinished produets 
and eonsumer goods will oontinue to be imported into the G.D.R. 
otnther Mittag, the Seat German economies minister, explained that
the next five-year plan (1*85-59) envisions more imports Of aaohin- 
ery* ether capital goods and complete factories,
P.R.G.-G.D.R. relations represent an extreme of seep* 
eration that eould probably never be achieved with other nations. 
The bond is a source of envy, perhaps, for ether nations ani a 
source of irritation for the U.S.S.R. yet* the ease of the t.B.R. 
is not completely unlike that*OF the other CMBA nations, they all, 
due to their size, are much more dependent on trade with the West, 
as has been seen.
*1
Haring briefly considered tk« development of teohnology 
transfer, its mtwi today and the web of daman Oetaalitlk. no 
dlsouesion ean be complete without arm attempting to eonsidar 
tha overall effectiveness of technology transfer and ita future.
■any questions still remain to bo poasd sdjeut tso^haolsgi^ trmdo.
Tha eharaetoristies of West Germany's Qe taafl.lt lk oan serve as use­
ful guides. West Germany is in a spaoial position. It is being 
pulled in almost opposite directions by its elosa aeonoaie ties 
with tha G.D.R. and the Soviet Union, tha key to oordial relations 
with the Bast, and German security tits to the U.s. and tha under­
lying concept of CoCom. Tha F.R.8. is the European country most 
physically exposed to tha Basti it is tha Bast’s most active 
Was tarn trading partner, The Bonn govamaant Has chosen inter­
dependence as tha hast course fat ■table relations. Tat, although 
tethnology transfer Is a major part of 9ut-Vi*t trad#, th|ro is 
no proof that it fulflile axpaotatians. Tha degret to whibh tha 
aaanamlas of either partner or both has bonafittad has n®»or bean 
varifiad.
Many studies have baan attmptodi four frequently cl tod 
analycbe, mo have attempted te prove the affeetiveneaa (or lath 
thereof) of technology transfer are Hanaon, Desai, Green and fctfihi 
and Gemnlbe. green and Levine released a study in 19?8 that attainted 
to quantify tha variation between marginal productivity of Weatifti
HIHAMW ffMtilfff ift nffififi lift fm w iu*49
#i mUnm inn ## im«« #* m iw§«i« «•* n vt 
4«t #m mwvm m n wi *n#tf*»yw .,*m* **** ^ 
*s*s'r/> *«* 44| 'ftHtMff** m*mt $* «* w nwn
B«iy| |*| ntimnin • I® «W»W •*■*■** 8*V»<Mpwf X*0?aMg»
*m|in twitm-* *p»ihp t******? «f i«»x4«»
UWll *l|fl4i sll^l UH|«MWJ4 4»»UMHJ4 XW(S«Hi * 8«|
Xt*t6fc* *MI|lSi 4|tH *4inm4w ikvvmm *f§mmp
in mill % ‘I|n9 fa»T*a» w%m* *&'•*•§ pm
of technology transfer*i her study (197$) argues that Mar superior 
level of Marginal productivity falls rapidly, lsading to low ratss 
of rotum (0.8-4.01 percent). Two signiftoaat difforotieos botwaon 
tha Dssai study and tho ona by Orasn and Levine ast ba pointad 
but whan eonsidaring tha raaults. Dasai usad a eaaffloiant af 
alastlolty of substitution only half that af tha Cobb-Sotiglas 
function af productivity in Oraan and Levine's work. Saoandly, 
unlika Oraan and Levine, sha assuaad Was tarn and dOMstio Soviet 
oapltal foods to ba tha saaa and did not separata thaw.
Ustly, Stanlslaw Ooaulka studios Polish industrial 
growth from 1970-1975. Ha also sought to quantify tha offsot of 
inportad machinery on the economy. Ooaulka foeussd on average 
labor productivity (APL). Ha assuaad that aaeh year's lino of 
Machinery and equipment embodied a new level of technology, the 
"Vintage capital" method. These vintages ware further divided into 
We?tern, other Socialist and domestic (Polish) sub-vintages. Other 
socialist machinery raised APL only 77 peroant as nuoh as Western 
import? and Polish oapltal only 46 peroant. Between 1971 and 1975* 
14.1 percent of Poland's 46 peroant rise in APL is unexplained. 
GomulKe esiouiated that Western oapltal resulted in 4.4 to 7.7 
percentage points of the 14.1 percent growth. However, he warned 
that tremendous levels of import? are necessary to make even mini­
mal improvements in APL.11®
Once again the root of the difficulties with tfceee studies 
•gd ethers lies with a lack of a banio— aeeeptad— definition of 
technology transfer and the unavoidable agMguitie* in aeaauraaent.
Of court*a, the impact on the Most is slightly easier to evaluate. 
Western firms receive acoaae to raw materials and now markets. 
Although debate still flourishes, the Office of Technology Assess* 
gent concluded that
"Western technologies, while no panaeea for
tstem economic problems, appear to benefit e economy of the purchase to a.muoh larger degree thin that of the seller."119
Analysis continues while technology trade remains toe 
large to be ignored and too small to be blindly accepted as criti­
cal. As mentioned earlier, the two blocks are unequally dependent 
on Bast-West trade. Although West Europe accounts for 25 percent 
of East European foreign trade, East Europe accounts for only 5
percent of West Europe's.120 Even for West Germany, CUBA trade
121acoount? for only 5>7 percent of Germany's total trade.
Sometimes this stunted growth is blamed on the political 
constraints placed on East-west trade. The spectacular blossoming 
of East-West trade during detente is viewed as proof.Yet, 
since Brandt's new variety of Ostaolitik. West German governments 
have made a consistent attempt to separate polities from trade as 
much as possible. The plateau currently reaehed in East-West 
trade is a direct function of a variety of interrelated and some­
times, contradictory forces operating in both the Western (here, 
German) and Eastern societies.
Many internal currents, aside from the political consider­
ations of maintaining relaxed working relations with the Bast, aot 
upon the West Oerman policies to promote technology transfers.
There are the long historic ties with Eastern areas as a result
of Germany's central position. Today* trade is also undeniably 
Important to the whole German eoonomyt foreign trad# provides 
10 percent of the country's GNP. For one example* one*third of 
all German machine tool exports are directed aoross the Iron Cur­
tain. The F.R.G. is trying to recover from the world recession* 
all trade is weloomo, especially technology transfer* which oan 
have long-term benefits. In addition* employment in many sectors
Is very dependent on healthy Bast-West trade levels* nearly 6 per-
12?cent of all employed workers or 300,000 jobs. \
On the other hand* many forces work to brake expanded 
trade. East-West trade oan also have a negative impact on employ­
ment in sectors affected by imported Eastern goods. Against this, 
only 350*000 new jobs were created in all 2b OECD member nations 
by East-West trade.Overall* the economio conditions in the 
West can also influence relations. If the F.R.G. outs imports from 
the East because of a domesti recession* the Eastern countries 
affected have less hard currency to buy German*,or Western* goodsi 
the multiplier effeot should not be forgotten. Of equal concern 
is the rising tide of protectionism throughout the West whioh is 
dosing off markets to fellow Western Allies as well as the nations 
of the Eastf again this leads to decreased sales. Tariff barriers* 
suoh as the EEC's ooamon tariff block a way to earn hard currency 
and tightening credit restrictions make hard currency all the more 
neoessary. Another foroe is the U.S.* speoifleally the American 
role in CoCom. The U.S.* out of strategic conoem, has Increasingly 
sought to broaden export oontrols. To settle the argument*
compromise ia naeaasary. Both aides must give a littlet again 
East-West trade ia directly affected.
Not all initiatives, or laok of any, originate in the 
West. However muoh eoonomio eonsiderations aight promote trade 
and teohnology transfer, disparities between the two systems them­
selves continue to inhibit relations. Noneonvertibility of curren- 
oies suggests counter-trade, which is, by nature, limited. If 
trade is conducted In hard ourrenoies, shortages of funds limit 
aeeess to Western goods. The tremendous debt of muoh of the bast 
in the West not only inhibits further eredit but also weighs eco­
nomic development down. The laok of flexibility in decision­
making frustrates many businesses. There are many delays in trans­
fer agreements. Negotiating and amending an agreement consumes 
valuable time. Often the host nation is unable to meet construc­
tion and delivery deadlines for plants, ete. Once all that is 
taken eare of, there are reorganisation delays and management 
resistance that must be overcome. Sisable delays of this sort 
oeour in 25 percent of F.R.G. technology deals with the East, 
according to German businessmen polled.Western firms antst 
often deal with insufficient information, whether due to seeurity 
classification or ignoranoe, and poor coamunioation ehannels. Poor 
quality of many Eastern products, requires quality controls andsuf­
ficient training for personnel. There are other difficulties. Some­
times Eastern firms refuse to play by accepted market rules (market 
territories, norms, quantitythe poor reputation for Eastern 
products must be ovoroomet there are confused lines of responsi­
bility, diffieulty sometimes in procuring spare parts, transportation
delays, etc.
on the other hand, there are obviously faotore promoting 
technological trade. As the population growth in Bast Burepe and 
European U.S.S.R. decline and the narginal oost of the faotore of 
production increases, productivity will have to rely Mrs on effec­
tive innovations, since the Eastern eeonomiss sees unable to 
modernize as needed, the West is the next logioal souroe. Thus, 
time leges oan be avoided, technology ean be more easily diffused 
and valuable investment and raw material need not be diverted.
This position has held sway in the past and will probably continue 
to do so.
Overall, the speeifie example of Germany, within the 
broader context of technology transfer in general, illustrates 
some important oonolusions about technology transfer. Historically, 
East-West technology ties have always existed, however buffeted 
by changes in the international arena. Relations might have sunk 
to minimal evels but the tie was never broken. This is both a 
warning and a message of hope in today's atmosphere of political 
or economic insecurity. Some nations, such as the P.R.G., have 
moved to decouple economics from polities. It would be unrealistic 
to maintain that, even if not directly linked to economies, polities 
does not have a major influence on it. The temptation to use trade 
as a lever will always be there. In tits past, it has not worked 
for Germany for the simple faet that the economic threats never 
equalled the political oost, especially with the Soviet Union. Both 
countries can rely on their respective economies if necessary. This
lessen Is net only applicable to Germany. Continuing Bast-West 
trade has demonstrated inherent systemio differences that still 
limit trade. She likelihood that either side can aoeomodate 
the other any more without simultaneous political ehange is 
minimal. East-West teehnology transfer will probably remain a 
bond between the members of a bipolar system it, most likely, 
is not a new hope for a new world order.
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